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NOTE
PATENTS & ANTITRUST: DOES A PATENT CONFER
MARKET POWER? A LOOK AT THE UPCOMING SUPREME
COURT CASE: ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS V INDEPENDENTINK
Sarah Knight*
I. INTRODUCTION

One company is "hooked" to financial inducements that amount to
"cocaine."' Another company must resort to hiding its relationship with a
party and labeling its brochures "secret and confidential." 2 A third
company was beaten into "guacamole" in retaliation for its relationship
with this same party.3 A fourth company "had a gun to his head" and must
stop buying from this same party.What would bring out such outrageous
allegations? The answer is Advanced Micro Devices' antitrust claim
against Intel for product bundling and alleged coercive practices.' In
regards to the bundling allegations, the treatment of the antitrust analysis
can differ depending on whether the bundling, or tying, behavior involves
only patented products or a combination of patented and non-patented
products. This Note explores the treatment of patents in antitrust cases, and
proposes that having a patent on a product should not presume to confer
market power, a key element in establishing an illegal monopoly under the
Sherman Act.6 Specifically, this Note addresses the possible implications
on patent to non-patent tying agreements after the U.S. Supreme Court
* J.D., University of Florida, Levin College of Law, 2006; M.S., Electrical Engineering,
University of Florida, 2006; B.S., Electrical Engineering, University of Florida, 2001. I would like
to thank Professor Richard Vermut for providing me with guidance in writing this Note.
1. Advanced Micro Devices' Complaint at 16, Advanced Micro Devices v. Intel Corp., No.
05-441 (D. Del. filed June 27,2005), available athttp://www.amd.corn/us-en/assets/contenttype/
DownloadableAssets/AMD-IntelFullComplaint.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2006).
2. Id. at 18.
3. Id. at 19.
4. Id. at 27. Of course, the conduct alleged by these statements has been denied, and claims
have been made of lack of information or belief to admit or deny any statement or representation
of the state of mind of these third parties. See Intel's Answer at 22-36, Advanced Micro Devices
v. Intel Corp., No. 05-441 (D. Del. filed Sept. 1, 2005), available at http://www.amd.com/usen/assets/content type/DownloadableAssets/ IntelAnswer.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
5. See Advanced Micro Devices' Complaint, supra note 1; Laurie J. Flynn, Media:
Advertising; Hi. We're A.M.D. PleaseListen, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2005, at C5.
6. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2004).
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hears Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink,7 and suggests that the
antitrust market power analysis should mirror the patent misuse market
power analysis.8

1I. BACKGROUND

The tension between intellectual property and antitrust law continues
to create uncertainty where the two laws intersect. The Sherman and
Clayton Acts are the central legislation governing United States antitrust
policy.9 The Sherman Act, enacted in 1890, proscribes illegal acts of
combining or conspiring to restrain trade.'" In 1914, partly in response to
a decision by the Supreme Court enforcing a patent tying arrangement,
Congress enacted section 3 of chapter 323 of the Clayton Act," which
makes it unlawful "to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods,
...whether patented or unpatented" on the condition that the purchaser
shall not use the goods of a competitor where the condition may
"substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly."' 2
Congress intended this provision of the Clayton Act to "strengthen the
Sherman Antitrust Act.' 13 In contrast to the apparent distrust of
7. 11. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 2937 (U.S. June 20,
2005) (No. 04-1329).
8. It is noteworthy that nothing in the patent laws "shall be deemed to convey to any person
immunity from civil or criminal liability, or to create any defenses to actions, under any antitrust
law." 35 U.S.C. § 211 (added Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3027).
9. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2004); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (2002).
10. See generally Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2004).
11. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1914).
12. Id.; Brief for Respondent at 12-13, Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., No. 04-1329
(U.S. filed Sept. 28, 2005) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2002)); see 3 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 2129-30 (Earl W. Kintner ed., 1978)
[hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] (statement of Sen. Walsh) (introducing legislation in order to
prevent the imposition of tying arrangements like the one upheld in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224
U.S. 1, 35 (1912) (involving a license on a patented mimeograph machine for use only with paper,
ink, and other supplies sold by the patent holder)).
13. Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 12-13 (citing LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supranote
12, at 2129-30) (statement of Sen. Reed)); see id. at 12 n.4 (quoting Henry, 224 U.S. at 35).
[N]oting that, while using a patent to impose a tying arrangement "will at first
strike us as being plainly in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act," the Court had
held that 'Congress alone has the power to determine what restraints [on patent
holders] shall be imposed,"' and therefore if patent tying arrangements
are not prohibited by "legislative act[,] the evil will go unchecked."
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concentrated economic power behind Congress's enactment of the
Sherman Act, Congress acted on its power to "promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts"' 4 by establishing limited duration monopolies. 5
To prove a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, which states:
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal," three elements must be
shown.' 6 Specifically, a plaintiff must show that the defendant: 1) entered
into a contract, 2) which was in restraint of trade or commerce, and 3)
plaintiff was damaged by the violation.' 7 There are two categories of
section 1violations: per se violations and "rule of reason" violations." The
four elements considered under a "rule of reason" analysis are:
(1) a relevant market existed that was affected by the challenged
restraint; (2) the defendant possessed 'market power' within the
relevant market; (3) there was an anticompetitive effect in the
intrabrand or interbrand market; and (4) the negative effects on
competition are not outweighed by the positive effects on
competition.' 9
The per se analysis does not look into the reasonableness of the action.2"
Rather, a per se treatment of an action is used "[o]nce experience with a
particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence
that the rule of reason will condemn it." 2 ' A tying arrangement is
particularly likely to be given per se treatment in the courts, 22 but the U.S.
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission do not usually
challenge tying arrangements as anticompetitive unless: "(1) the seller has
market power in the tying product, (2) the arrangement has an adverse
effect on competition in the relevant market for the tied product, and (3)
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
15. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2002). The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office was established by 35
U.S.C. § 1(a) (2000).
16. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004); Spanish Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Clear Channel
Commc'ns, Inc., 242 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2003), aft'd, 376 F.3d 1065 (1 1th Cir.
2004).
17. Spanish Broad., 242 F. Supp. 2d at 1356 (citing Moeker v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 144 F.
Supp. 2d 1291, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 2001)).
18. Id.(citing Moeker, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 1301-02).
19. Id. at 1357 (citing Godix Equip. Exp. Corp. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1570, 1579
(S.D. Fla. 1996)).
20. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982).
21. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (citing Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 344).
22. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 9 (1958).
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efficiency justifications for the arrangement do not outweigh the
anticompetitive effects. 23
A tying arrangement within the prohibition of section 1of the Sherman
Act has been defined as "an agreement by a party to sell one product but
only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different . ..
product., 2 4 In essence, the monopoly granted by a patent of one invention
cannot be enlarged for the exploitation of a monopoly granted by another
patent, for the exploitation of an unpatented article, or for the exploitation
or promotion of a business not specified or brought by the patent.2 ' The
Court in InternationalSalt Co. v. United States reiterated this view by
explaining that "patents confer no right to restrain use of, or trade in,
unpatented salt," and that "[b]y contracting to close this market for salt
against competition, International has engaged in a restraint of trade for
which its patents afford no immunity from the anti-trust laws."2 6
2z
In 1958, the Court in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States
held that a tying arrangement violates the Sherman Act due to the
''sufficient economic power to impose an appreciable restraint on free
competition in the tied product., 21 Under the test in Northern Pacific,
"market power could be inferred from [the defendant] having 'unique
economic advantages' of some kind., 29 Subsequent cases refined the test
for determining whether a tying arrangement violated section 1 of the
Sherman Act as to whether a defendant has "'market power' in the market
for the tying product. 30 In particular, the Court in UnitedStates v. Loew's
specified that market power can be presumed when the tying product is
patented.31 This presumption was expressly restated by
32 the U.S. Supreme
Court in U.S. Steel Corp. v. FortnerEnterprises,Inc.
23. Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property issued by the Department
of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (Apr. 6, 1995), reprintedin 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
13,132 (1995); § 5.3, 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,743-3, availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
24. N.Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5; see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs.,
Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461 (1992).
25. Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 456-58 (1940).
26. Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-96 (1947); see also Mercoid Corp. v.
Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator
Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
27. N.Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 1.
28. Id.at 11; see also Indep. Ink, Inc. v.111. Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (quoting N.Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 11).
29. Indep. Ink, 396 F.3d at 1347 n.6.
30. Id. at 1347.
31. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962).
32. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610,619 (1977) (Fortner II); see Indep.
Ink, 396 F.3d at 1348. The Court in Independent Ink elaborated, quoting FortnerII, 429 U.S. at

2006]
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1H. THE CASE OF INDEPENDENTINK V. ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS

By granting certiorari for the case of Illinois Tool Works v. Independent
33
Ink,"
the U.S. Supreme Court has "agreed to consider overturning a 43year-old precedent that has been interpreted to make it easy for
competitors to sue patent holders for antitrust violations. 34 This fortythree year old precedent, which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit followed in Independent Ink v. Illinois Tool Works,35 comes from
the 1962 ruling in United States v. Loew S.36
In Loew's, the United States brought antitrust actions against six major
distributors of copyrighted motion picture feature films for their
engagement in block-booking.37 Specifically, the United States alleged that
the defendants conditioned the license or sale of one or more feature films
upon the acceptance by a television station of a package, or block,
containing one or more unwanted or inferior films.38 At issue was whether
the specific tying arrangements violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.3 9
The Court in Loew 's held that the film distributors' block-booking added
to the monopoly of the feature films' copyrights and constituted a violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act.4 Reasoning that tying agreements only
suppress competition by forcing buyers to give up purchasing substitutes
for the tied product, and by destroying the free access of competing
suppliers of the tied product to the consuming market, the Court in Loew 's
concluded that a tying agreement is illegal where the seller has market
dominance. 4 ' The Court further explained that market dominance can be
inferred from a tying product's uniqueness in its attributes. In particular,

619, "[T]he statutory grant of a patent monopoly in [International Salt] ...represented tying
products ...sufficiently unique to give rise to a presumption of economic power." Indep. Ink, 396
F.3d at 1348 (alteration in original).
33. Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 2937 (June 20, 2005)
(No. 04-1329).
34. Tony Mauro, High Court to Re-evaluate Precedent Affecting Antitrust Law, 129
RECORDER (San Francisco), June 21, 2005, at 119.
35. Indep. Ink, 396 F.3d at 1342.
36. Loew's, 371 U.S. at 38. This case is a consolidation of a number of civil antitrust actions
instituted by the U.S. government against six defendants, five of which appealed. Id.at 40, 44.
37. Id. at 40. The six major distributors consisted of C&C Super Corp., Loew's, Screen
Gems, Associated Artists Productions, National Telefilm Associates (which did not appeal), and
United Artists Corp. See id. at 41-44.
38. Id. at 40.
39. Id.at 44.
40. Id.at 47, 50-51.
41. Loew's, 371 U.S. at 44-45.
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the Court in Loew's noted that "[t]he requisite economic power is
'
presumed when the tying product is patented or copyrighted."42
Consequently, Loew's stands for the notion that a patent on a product
creates a presumption of power over the marketplace such that a defendant
tying43 to a patented product is guilty of illegal tying under the Sherman
Act.

Similarly, IndependentInk v. Illinois Tool Works relates to an antitrust
claim for tying arrangements." In particular, Independent Ink, Inc.
(Independent Ink) manufactures ink for inkjet printers.4 5 Independent Ink
brought suit against printhead system manufacturer, Illinois Tool Works,
Inc. and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Trident, Inc. (Trident).46 Trident
manufactures printheads and owns U.S. Patent No. 5,343,226, which
covers Trident's printhead technology. 47 In addition to manufacturing
printheads, Trident manufactures ink for use with its patented printheads.48
Trident licenses the use of its patented printheads to manufacturers of
printers. 49 The manufacturers ofprinters who sign Trident's standard form
licensing agreement for the use of Trident's patented printheads agree to
purchase their ink exclusively from Trident.5" Trident's licensing
agreement specifically "grants the right to 'manufacture, use and sell...
ink jet printing devices supplied by Trident' only 'when used in
combination with ink and ink supply systems supplied by Trident."'5 1
Based on the tying agreement conditioning the sale of Trident's
printheads with Trident manufactured ink, Independent Ink alleged in its
complaint that Trident "was engaged in illegal tying and monopolization
in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et

42. Id. at 45. The Court also explained that
[s]ince one of the objectives of the patent laws is to reward uniqueness, the
principle of these cases was carried over into antitrust law on the theory that the
existence of a valid patent on the tying product, without more, establishes a
distinctiveness sufficient to conclude that any tying arrangement involving the
patented product would have anticompetitive consequences.
Id. at 46
43.
44.
45.
46.

(citing Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947)).
Id. at 45; see Mauro, supranote 34.
Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1345.
Id. at 1344.

47. Id.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 1345.
Indep. Ink, 396 F.3d at 1344, 1345.
Id. at 1345.
Id.
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seq."52 Both Independent Ink and Trident moved for summary judgment
as to the section 1 claim of the Sherman Act, and Trident moved for
summary judgment as to the section 2 claim of the Sherman Act. 3 The
United States District Court for the Central District of California held that
the plaintiff must affirmatively prove market power in order for patent
tying to constitute a violation of section 1 and section 2 of the Sherman
Act.54 Accordingly, the district court granted summary judgment in favor
of Trident for both the section 1 and the section 2 claims. 5
Independent Ink appealed the judgment of the district court to the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.56 At issue was whether patent tying is
illegal per se under the Sherman Act, or whether the plaintiff must prove
that the patent confers market power in the relevant market for the tying
product.57
The District Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, basing its
decision on the Loew's precedent and the FortnerII dictum, held that a
patent presumptively defines the relevant market as the nationwide market
for the patented product itself, and creates a presumption of power within
this market.5 In addition, once the plaintiff establishes a patent tying
agreement, it is the defendant's burden to rebut the presumption of market
power.59

IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ASSERTION THAT A PATENT CREATES A

PRESUMPTION OF MARKET POWER
The Court in Loew's stated that "[t]he requisite economic power is
presumed when the tying product is patented or copyrighted., 60 However,
patents rarely confer significant market power.6 1 The strength of a patent
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Indep. Ink, 396 F.3d at 1345 (citing Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Trident, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d
1155, 1162 (C.D. Cal. 2002)).
55. Trident, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1177.
56. Indep. Ink, 396 F.3d at 1344.
57. Id. at 1346.
58. Id. at 1352.
59. Id.
60. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45-46 (1962) (citing Int'l Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948)).
61. See Brief for Petitioner at 14, 111. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., No. 04-1329 (U.S.
filed Aug. 4, 2005). The Brief for Petitioner stated:
Empirical data strongly support this broadly-held view, demonstrating that a large
percentage of patents produce little or no economic value - the opposite of what

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LA W & POLICY

[Vol. 11

rests on the scope of its claims. A patent may be granted on narrow
improvements as long as those improvements are new, useful, and nonobvious.62 A single patented product, whether "[a]n article of manufacture,
machine, or composition of matter may embody hundreds or conceivably
thousands of patented inventions."63
In addition, in areas of heavily developed technology, many
competitors hold patents.' Often these patents cover incremental
improvements on similar products.65 In order to actually sell the product,
competitors must cross-license their patents.66 For example, in the
automotive industry there are several competitors, each with a large
number of patents covering hundreds or thousands of aspects of an
automobile.67 In order to avoid infringing each others' patents, they must
cross-license. Accordingly, it would be difficult to assume that one of the
competitors has market power solely by the existence of a single patent.68
A patent does confer an owner of a patent the right to exclude others
from making, using, and offering for sale a particular invention. 69 This
right does not preclude others from creating effective, non-infringing

would be true if a patent typically conferred market power upon the patent holder.
One study found that "at any given time, over about 95 percent of patents are
unlicensed and over about 97 percent are generating no royalties." S. Vermont,
"The Economics of Patent Litigation," in From Ideas to Assets: Investing Wisely
in Intellectual Property 327, 332 (B. Berman, ed. 2002); see also Feldman [The
Insufficiency ofAntitrustAnalysisfor PatentMisuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 437
(2003)] ("eighty percent to ninety percent of patents never create any monetary
return for the patent holder"); R. Rapp & L. Stiroh, "Standard Setting and Market
Power," presented at Joint Hearings of the United States Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission, at 1 (April 18, 2002) ("Empirical research by
Scherer, Pakes, Schankerman, Lanjouw and others has established and confirmed
a useful generalization: that the distribution of patent values is skewed; most
patents (and patented inventions) are worth very little and only a very few have
considerable value.") (citing studies), available at http://www.ftc.
gov/os/comments/intelpropertycomments/nera.pdf.
Id. at 25-26. In addition, market power in the relevant market for a patent is determined in view of
the circumstances. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2003).
62. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952), § 102 (2002), § 103 (2004).
63. Brief of Amici Curiae Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago in Support of
Petitioners at 9, Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., No. 04-1329 (U.S. filed July 26, 2005).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.at 9-10.
68. See Amici Curiae, supra note 63, at 10.
69. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2002).
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substitutes, which can compete with the patented invention.7" Rather, "the
patent law encourages competitors to design or invent around existing
patents."'" Consequently, as articulated by Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley:
[I]f I have a patent on an easy-opening soft drink can, no one
else during the life of the patent can duplicate this precise can in a
way that would constitute patent infringement. However, (1) there
may be alternative easy-opening cans, whether patented or
unpatented, that are as good as or superior to mine; or (2) easyopening cans may not be all that valuable to consumers, who would
just as soon have the traditional cans or who would buy their soft
drinks in bottles in response to any price increase in cans .... My
patent grant creates an antitrust 'monopoly' only if it succeeds in
giving me the exclusive right to make something for which there
are not adequate market alternatives, and for which consumers
would be willing to pay a monopoly price.72
Accordingly, a patent looked at in a vacuum without any market analysis,
is not a good indicator of monopoly power in a market.
In contrast, those arguing for maintaining the presumption, claim that
close available substitutes of a patented product usually infringe on the
patent. For example, counsel for Independent Ink stated that "close
available substitutes usually infringe on the patent because a patent
extends to all products that include the principles of the invention .... A
substitute that works for one buyer may not work for another buyer;
73
however, the patented product covers the needs of multiple buyers.
Unfortunately, this is a myopic view of a substitute product. Although
equivalent products may infringe a patent,74 the cases found in registers
from the U.S. Supreme Court to the district courts are full of examples of

70. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177-78 (1965);
see SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981) ("the patented product, as is
often the case, represents merely one of many products that effectively compete in a given product
market"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982); see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 61, at 13.
71. WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int'l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also
Westvaco Corp. v. Int'l Paper Co., 991 F.2d 735, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1993); State Indus., Inc. v. A.O.
Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235-36 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
72. H. HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTrrRUST § 4.2, at 4-8 to 4-9 (2006); see also Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 61, at 13-14.
73. Edward O'Connor, PossibleImplicationsoflndependentInk's Supreme CourtHearing,
availableat http://www. rechargermag.com/news.asp?id=200509052 (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
74. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2003).
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simple design-arounds that do not infringe a very similar patented
product.75
It is true that "[t]he mere presence of competing substitutes for the
tying product ... is insufficient to destroy the legal, and indeed the
economic, distinctiveness of the [patented] product."7 6 However, even the
U.S. Supreme Court has noted that "it is common knowledge that a patent
does not always confer a monopoly over a particular commodity. Often the
patent is limited to a unique form or improvement of the product
77 and the
slight.,
is
privileges
patent
the
from
resulting
economic power
In addition, the market itself can affect the power of a particular patent.
A patent confers a monopoly for a period of twenty years from the
effective filing date of the patent application.78 Within those years, the
patent may become outmoded or obsolete. 79 The market power of a patent
is related to the relationship of the patent to the technology still in
existence in the marketplace.8" For example, a patent covering the
technology of a 3.5 inch floppy diskette for portable data storage for
computers "does not, standing alone, indicate that the patent owner has
market power in the removable data storage device field."'" In fact, today,
many laptop computers are sold without a floppy diskette reader and
instead have readable or writable optical disks and USB ports for

75. Not to mention the great doctrine of prosecution history estoppel, which can be quite
limiting for protected equivalents. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 304
F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Tool Works, 396 F.3d 1342, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Digidyne
76. Indep. Ink, Inc. v. I11.
Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1345 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. Loew's,
Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 49 (1962))).
77. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 10 n.8 (1958).
A common misconception has been that a patent or copyright, a high market
share, or a unique product that competitors are not able to offer suffice to
demonstrate market power. While each of these three factors might help to give
market power to a seller, it is also possible that a seller in these situations will
have no market power: for example, a patent holder has no market power in any
relevant sense if there are close substitutes for the patented product.
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 37 n.7 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
see Brief for Petitioner, supra note 61, at 26; see generally William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARv. L. REV 937 (1981).
78. 35 U.S.C § 154 (2002).
79. See Amici Curiae, supra note 63, at 10.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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connecting to portable memory sticks.82 Therefore, it is unreasonable to
presume that a patent creates market power.
The market power presumption most likely "resulted from confusion
between an economic monopoly and a patent right."83 As Judge Posner and
Professor Landes explain, "One does not say that the owner of a parcel of
land had a monopoly because he has the right to exclude others from using
the land. But a patent or copyright is a monopoly in the same sense."84
Moreover, if it is established that a patent holder does not have significant
market power, a patent tie can only enhance competition in the relevant
market for the patented product.85
However, the question still remains as to who gets to compete in the
relevant market. In certain markets, a small number of companies control
and dominate, effectively excluding smaller companies from entering into
competition. 86 Each md
individual company does not have significant market
power, but together they can edge out smaller, less established companies.
Although some small companies may suffer, as long as the dominating
companies do not act together in a way that violates the Sherman Act, the
capitalist system will work.87
82. Id.
83. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 61, at 25. It should be noted that market power analysis
for a section 2 claim of the Sherman Act is treated differently than a section 1 claim. Section 2 of
the Sherman Act states: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony."
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004). An extension of the monopoly granted by a patent to
unpatented articles beyond the scope of the legal monopoly conferred by the patent is a violation
of section 2 ofthe Sherman Act. Allen v. Ideal Prods., Inc., 300 F. Supp. 349, 354 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
"To establish a monopolization claim under section 2 ofthe Sherman Act, there must be monopoly
power in the relevant market and the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power." Indep. Ink
v. Ill. Tool Works, 396 F.3d 1342, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law
Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004)). In contrast to the presumption of market
power in a section 1 case, "[i]n section 2 cases, the plaintiff bears the burden of defining the market
and proving defendant's power in that market." Indep. Ink, 396 F.3d at 1353.
84. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 374 (2003); see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 61, at 25;
EUGENE SINGER, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 112 (1981).

85. See Brief for Petitioner, supranote 61, at 30-31 (quoting Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.
2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,37 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Absent [market] power tying cannot
conceivably have any adverse impact in the tied-product market, and can be only pro-competitive
in the tying product market.")).
86. See also O'Connor, supra note 73.
87. But cf id.
It is almost a guarantee that if the doctrine is reversed and patentees are able to
legally tie their patented products to their non-patented products multiple
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Independent Ink claims that the patents used in tying arrangements that
are targeted by antitrust claims are most likely highly valuable patents, and
that highly valuable patents are likely to confer market power.88 In
addition, it claims that "[o]nly a highly valuable patent can be used to
force customers to buy a distinct product that they otherwise would not
purchase, especially at a price they do not want to pay., 89 Its main policy
argument for maintaining the presumption that a patent confers market
power is that small businesses and consumers with limited resources will
be able to "bring meritorious tying claims without incurring the prohibitive
cost of... market share analysis." 90 In essence, the patent holder can more
efficiently determine its own market share. 9' Moreover, because the patent
tying presumption affects only the market power element of a tying claim,
a plaintiff still has the burden of proving the other elements of a tying
claim, and defendants still retain their affirmative defenses.92 Therefore,
when a tying arrangement is genuinely pro-competitive, the other elements
of a tying claim and the affirmative defenses should be able to screen out
liability.93
As a consequence, the patent holder will have to bear a financial
burden in overcoming the presumption of market power.94 In particular,
"[t]he presumption can only be rebutted by expert testimony or other
credible economic evidence of the cross-elasticity of demand, the area of
'
effective competition, or other evidence of lack of market power."95
Illinois Tool Works argues that "the presumption [on the defendant of
market power] increases the chances that deficient claims will survive
motions to dismiss and [motions] for summary judgment." 96 It believes
that the survival of deficient claims based on the presumption of market

industries will be affected and go out of business overnight. And there will be
absolutely nothing that anyone can do to prevent this because it is impossible to
prove monopoly power from an independent company that is part of an oligopoly.
Id.
88. Brief for Respondent, supranote 13, at 9.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Brief for Respondent, supranote 13, at 12.
94. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 61, at 32-33.
95. Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, 396 F.3d 1342, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Tanaka
v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001); Forro Precision, Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Machs.
Corp., 673 F.2d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1982).
96. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 61, at 33.
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power increases the odds of unjustified settlement payments from innocent
defendants confronted by the high expense of an antitrust trial.97
Although Congress has remained silent on the standard of determining
market power for section 1 violations, in 1988, Congress enacted the
Patent Misuse Reform Act.98 The Act requires proof of actual market
power to establish a patent misuse defense based on patent tying. 99
Patent misuse is a defense to a claim of patent infringement.'00 The
seminal case introducing the concept of patent misuse is Morton Salt v.
G.S. Suppiger.0°' At issue in Morton Salt was not whether Morton Salt
violated the Clayton Act, but whether a court of equity should protect
Morton Salt's patent monopoly when Morton Salt was using its patent
monopoly as the effective means of restraining competition in the sale of
an unpatented article. 0 2 The Court in Morton Salt held that a court in
equity should not protect a patent from infringement until the actions
restraining competition with the patentee's sale of an unpatented product
have been abandoned and "that the consequences of the misuse of the

97. Id.
98. See Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-703, § 201, 102 Stat. 4674 (codified at 35
U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2003)).
99. Id. In addition, the Senate version of the bill contained an additional provision overruling
the market power presumption. Moreover, the legislative history of the Patent Misuse Reform Act
states that "because the measure was considered at the end of the congressional session, 'the House
did not have time to consider and approve th[e] measure' eliminating the presumption in antitrust
tying cases." Brief for Petitioner, supra note 61, at 40-41 (quoting 134 Cong. Rec. S17,148 (Oct.
21, 1988) (statement of Sen. Leahy)); see generally Robin Cooper Feldman, The Insufficiency of
AntitrustAnalysisforPatentMisuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399,420 (2003) (the Patent Misuse Reform
Act was "a cloakroom compromise in the waning days of the 100th Congress").
Although section 271 (d)(5) does not define the scope of the defense of patent
misuse, but merely provides a safe harbor against the charge of patent misuse for
certain kinds of conduct by patentees, the statute makes clear that the defense of
patent misuse differs from traditional antitrust law principles in an important
respect, as applied to tying arrangements involving patent rights. In the case of an
antitrust claim based on a tying arrangement involving patent rights, [the Court of
Appeals for the Federal District] has held that ownership of a patent on the tying
good is presumed to give the patentee monopoly power .... Section 271(d)(5)
makes clear, however, that such a presumption does not apply in the case of patent
misuse. To establish the defense of patent misuse, the accused infringer must show
that the patentee has power in the market for the tying product.
U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 424 F.3d 1179, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
100. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2003).
101. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
102. Id. at490.
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The policy behind the Court's holding

The grant to the inventor of the special privilege of a patent
monopoly carries out a public policy adopted by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, 'to promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to... Inventors the
exclusive Right.. . .' to their 'new and useful' inventions. But the
public policy which includes inventions within the granted
monopoly excludes from it all that is not embraced in the invention.
It equally forbids the use of the patent to secure an exclusive right
or limited monopoly not granted by the Patent Office and which it
is contrary to public policy to grant."
The policy behind granting a "monopoly" to a patent holder does not
change because we are looking at an antitrust action rather than an
infringement claim. Congress, in its enactment of the Patent Misuse
Reform Act, saw it fit to not require a patent owner to have the burden of
proving that he did not have market power in the relevant market for the
patent. 105
Because of the similarities between a section 1 violation and actions
considered to be patent misuse, a patent owner should not be presumed to
have market power in the relevant market. In particular, conduct that can
be considered a section 1 violation very often can be considered patent
misuse. Because of the weight of anticompetitive effects in shaping the
defense of patent misuse, the analysis of tying arrangements in the context
of patent misuse is closely related to the analysis of tying arrangements in
the context of antitrust law."6 In addition,
certain specific practices have been identified as constituting per se
patent misuse, "including so-called 'tying' arrangements in which
a patentee conditions a license under the patent on the purchase of
a separable, staple good, and arrangements in which a patentee

103. Id. at 493.
104. Id. at 492 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; 35 U.S.C. § 31 (2002)) (alteration in original)
(internal citations omitted).
105. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2003).
106. U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 424 F.3d 1179, 1185 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also
Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868-69 (Fed. Cir. 1997). It should be noted that
Congress has specified that certain practices, which would be subject to scrutiny under antitrust
law, do not constitute patent misuse. See 35 U.S.C. § 27 I(d) (2003).
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effectively extends the
term of its patent by requiring post07
royalties."'
expiration
In U.S. Philips Corp. v. InternationalTrade Commission,'08 the Federal
Circuit found it entirely rational for a patent owner to charge what the
market will bear for an essential patent in one market and offer nonessential patents in a second market for free.l0 9 This would make a patentto-patent tying arrangement not per se unlawful because in order to show
that a tying arrangement is per se unlawful, a plaintiff must show that the
tying arrangement links two separate products and has an anticompetitive
effect in the second product's market." 0 Accordingly, this concept appears
very similar to a tying arrangement under the Sherman Act.
In a novel approach, in the realm of medical drugs and devices,
companies may have a ready defense against claims of illegally tying
products."'l For example, Pfizer plans to sell a new heart treatment drug,
Torcetrapib, only in combination with its cholesterol drug, Lipitor, whose
active ingredient is atorvastatin." 2 Currently, Lipitor is the world's top3
selling cholesterol medicine, with sales of almost $11 billion in 2004.'
The combination pill of Lipitor and Torcetrapib may protect Lipitor from
generic competition after Pfizer's Lipitor patent expires in 2010.114
Pfizer's critics, including prominent cardiologists, believe that Pfizer
should offer Torcetrapib as a stand-alone pill so that patients can take
Torcetrapib with other cholesterol drugs rather than only Pfizer's
Lipitor."1 In addition, when the generic versions of Lipitor can enter the
market, the problem will be that although patients will be able to purchase
generic versions of Lipitor, anyone who wants to take Torcetrapib along
with atorvastatin would only be able to purchase it from Pfizer. "6 It would
appear that Pfizer's plan violates antitrust law, specifically the prohibition
of tying products together, or refusing to sell one product unless customers
buy another.'17 However, "antitrust lawyers said the company's plans were

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

U.S. Philips Corp., 424 F.3d at 1185 (quoting Va. Panel Corp., 133 F.3d at 869).
Id. at 1179.
Id. at 1191.
Id. at 1193-94.
Alex Berenson, Pfizer Seeks to Link Heart Medicines Critics Want New Drug to Be

Available as Stand-Alone Pill,INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 8, 2005, at 15.

112. Id.
113. Id.

114. Id.
115.

Id.

116. Berenson, supra note 111, at 15.
117. Id.
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legal, as long as the FDA approved the drugs in combinnt; "18 1,n f5ct,
Pfizer has been working closely with the FDA to design its clinical tests
examining "whether the [T]orcetrapib-Lipitor combination reduces heart
disease more effectively than Lipitor alone."' 19 Herb Hovenkamp, a law
professor at the University of Iowa, explained, "It's the FDA that's doing
the tying," and "[a]ssuming the FDA accepts Pfizer's test results and
certifies this drug only when it's taken in conjunction with Lipitor, then
that would then become the government's restraint, not Pfizer's
restraint. '"12° Accordingly, it appears that a company could get away with
a tying arrangement based on its New Drug Approval request. 2 '
Here, Pfizer is only testing and seeking FDA approval for the drug
combination, and not for Torcetrapib alone.'22 Unless Pfizer decides to not
test Torcetrapib in combination with Lipitor and then request FDA
approval, Torcetrapib will not be available to the public. Moreover, the
FDA is not in a position to approve Torcetrapib unless testing has been
done.

V. CONCLUSION

The most recent conflict in antitrust law is the effect of patent
ownership on the determination of whether a tying, or bundling, agreement
is anti-competitive and creates an illegal monopoly. A patent grants the
owner a limited duration monopoly on the specific technology claimed in
the patent. This monopoly does not automatically indicate that the owner
has market power for the technology. Instead, the monopoly just keeps
others from making or using a specific claimed technology. Moreover, a
patent owner is not even required to use or market the patented
technology. Accordingly, an analysis of alternative technologies should be
made before determining market power in the relevant market. The
relevant market should not be the specifically claimed technology and its
equivalents, but the larger general purpose of the specifically claimed
technology and needs met by that specifically claimed technology.
In addition, the burden of proving market power should rest on the
plaintiff bringing an antitrust suit. This burden shift would place the patent
holder in the same position as in a patent infringement suit where the

118.
119.
120.
121.
N.Y.L.J.
122.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Gordon Schnell, Pfizer's Cholesterol Gambit: Dodging the Antitrust Laws?, 234
4 (2005).
Id.
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alleged infringer has the burden of proving market power when using the
affirmative defense of patent misuse by the patent owner. The presumption
that a patent confers market power unjustifiably increases the cost of
owning, licensing, and enforcing intellectual property. The divergence in
treatment of antitrust and patent misuse on the issue of patent tying needs
to be remedied. The first step in aligning these laws would be a ruling
from the U.S. Supreme Court reversing the holding in IndependentInk in
order to remove the presumption of market power in a patent tying case.
In the event that the U.S. Supreme Court affirms the presumption of
market power, a pharmaceutical loophole may be exploited. However, the
ultimate burden on aligning these laws rests with Congress, which has the
power to codify the burden of the plaintiff when alleging a defendant is
conducting an illegal tying arrangement. Accordingly, Congress should
amend the Sherman Act to include a statement requiring a plaintiff
bringing an action under section 1 of the Sherman Act to prove that a
patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the patented
product on which a license or sale is conditioned.
VI.

AUTHOR'S ADDENDUM

The Supreme Court has ruled on this case since the writing of this
Note.'2 3 I am pleased to note that the Court held that just because a tying
product is patented, it does not necessarily support a presumption of
market power.' 24 The Court appeared to agree with the arguments of the
respondent and the various Amici Curiae in Support of respondent by
stating that
Congress, the antitrust enforcement agencies, and most economists
have all reached the conclusion that a patent does not necessarily
confer market power upon the patentee. Today, we reach the same
conclusion, and therefore hold that, in all cases involving a tying
arrangement, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has market
power in the tying product.'25
This ruling should clarify the role of having a patent on the presumption
of market power in antitrust cases. However, it would still be beneficial to
.have Congress codify that a patent does not automatically confer market
power.
123. See Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006).
124. Id. at 1284.
125. Id. at 1293.
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